

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Revised Outline

Rev: 25 Apr 1964

Rev: 5 May 1964

MPC *mpc 7 may*

HISTORY OF CIA, 1960-1963: TRANSITION YEARS

- I. The Image of CIA and USIB By 1960: on the eve of the National Change of Command: Progress and problems of the US Intelligence Community, during its last year, serving abroad and at home as an instrument of national policy: starting the new "fiscal year" 1961, in July-Aug 1960, and last year under what in any case was to be the ~~outgoing~~ ^{END OF THE} Eisenhower Administration.

1. CIA's Self-Estimates of its Stewardship, as of July 1960:
The DCI's Community-wide appraisal submitted to the President et al: the DCI's annual report to the NSC, 30 Aug 1960;

Comparatively, other reports and appraisals rendered by the DCI and top management, as of 1960, either as head of CIA and/or chairman of USIB structure:

^{BUDGET}
~~Project~~ justifications, 1960 -- Comptroller files
Briefing notes? - O/DDI briefing files
Informal memoranda to the President et al? Re-check
DCI/ER 1960 file
Public and confidential testimony to Congressional authorities? O/GC and O/LC files
AWD's swan song for the ~~old~~ ^{outgoing} Eisenhower Administration, speech 17 Jan 1961 ,

2. CIA and USIB Charters, by 1960: summary of their structures and management policies for carrying out the (above) activities and programs:

Directives: NSCID's, last revised in 1958, being readied for new Administration without ^{ESSENTIAL} change.

DCI's Community-wide DCI Directives, by 1960

DCI's Hqs Regulations and Field Regulations


^{OTHERS, comparatively?}

Organization charts for USIB and CIA (structure & leadership):

CIA's directorates and field establishment, in AWD's last year

USIB and its committee and working-group structure, by 1960

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

DCI's "Coordination" Responsibilities, in Theory and Practice, by 1960:

- Production and Dissemination Programs
- Collection and Collection Requirements System
- CS (and CA) Activities
- Technical Programs and R&D for the future
- Admin Support
- Management, Inspection, and Review Authority

3. Outgoing Commander's Appraisals of CIA and USIB, by 1960:
appraisals up to Jan 1961 by the outgoing President Eisenhower and his key advisers at the command, operations, and policy level and by his instruments of Presidential inspection and review; all at the national-command level of accountability:

Survey and review reports, ca 1960, by:

- Budget Bureau reviews, primarily in re upcoming 1961-62 budgets

- Pres. Board of Intell. Consultants (Hull), from perspective of "national citizens advisory committee"

- NSC Sprague Committee review, in re certain non-intell programs (both in and outside the USIB family), again on "national citizens" level but a one-shot affair: see DDP/CA files, Feb 1960 ff.

- Joint Study Group, launched July 1960, at beginning of the critical year, and on the eve of inevitably critical months, politically speaking; report^u Dec 1960.

Expressions by the President (Eisenhower) and the VP (Nixon) themselves, as they viewed CIA and USIB in the last months of an 8-year command relationship: re-check 1960 DCI/ER files

4. CIA's Prestige at the Legislative-Branch Level of Accountability; as of 1960:

The pattern of "CIA" subcommittees in the House and Senate, by 1960:

- Cannon, Vinson, Hayden, Russell, et al

Established relationships with other Congressional Committees and Staffs, by 1960:

- Foreign Relations, House and Senate
- Joint Economic Committee
- Space Committees, House and Senate
- Joint Atomic Energy Committee

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

CIA's reputation on Capitol Hill, ca. 1960 ...

The continuing pressures for more intimate Intelligence liaison, 1960:

The status of the old "watchdog" committee, by 1960, dating back to before Mansfield's before ca. 1954.

Other Congressional probes skirting on matters of Intelligence management, 1960:

"Scoop" Jackson's NSC "machinery" committee

Fulbright's committee, in re foreign policy,

State, and "ambassador" prerogatives

Symington's committee, in re defense management and DOD

Stennis Preparedness Committee?

DCI's extensive reporting on major "CIA"-related issues, addressed to the established Congressional authorities (above), achieved by summer-fall 1960:

U-2 issue

Missile gap issue

Other issues?

Public appreciations and private expressions on CIA and USIB in Congress, in balance, e.g.

Comments on CIA's Budget, 1960 (see Comptroller)

Cannon's public accolade ca. May 1960; and others

Dissenting views?

Re-check above historical sequences in O/LC, O/GC, DCI/PA, and DCI/IG files.

5. CIA's International Reputation by 1960: among friendly, neutral, and hostile security services (and among their respective principals*); and continuing liaison programs of CIA for cultivating world-wide assets for US future programs: Re-check at DDP/CI

* E.g., Macmillan, Adenauer, Khrushchev, et al

6. CIA's "public" image, in the domestic and foreign press, by 1960:

E.g., case study of U-2 shoot-down incident (May 1960): *collation and* review of various ^{historical} ~~case studies~~ ^{or} ~~case studies~~ on U-2, to illustrate typical pattern ^{of} attacks and accolades on US intelligence, both at home and abroad, alternately leveled by friend and foe, and in various contexts, e.g., (among others) context of US policy and operations; not only in the domestic and foreign "press," technically speaking, but also in the organs of opinion

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-4-

in Congress, within the Executive Branch, ^{"family"} (among critics and defenders), and among both parties as they were meanwhile campaigning to take over the Government in the forthcoming election in November 1960 and inauguration in January 1961

Other public issues involving "CIA" and "Intelligence" -- in (a) the noisy campaign year of 1960, and in (b) the noisy year at the UN as well, after Khrushchev's "shoe" came down on the table:

Soviet strength and intentions; missile gap, etc.
China, Quemoy, Matsu, etc.; and southeast Asia;
Africa?

DCI's public statements, c. 1960- -- rare but significant

CIA and White House "responsibilities" to the public
press re "Intelligence." ...:
NSCID Mandate and USIB concern

CIA's Public Critics and Defenders, c. 1960-
Congressional
Academic Elite
Business Elite
Columnists and Commentators

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-5-

II. Pre-Election Transition Planning and Liaison at CIA and NSC *levels*,
Jan-Oct 1960

1. Pre-1960 Precedents^{available in 1960} in CIA are supporting previous Presidential-Campaign Changeovers:

1948: Truman-Barkley vs. Dewey-Warren

Dewey's liaison with Sec State Marshall and NSC
(also CIA?): Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles;
Marshall Carter?

Allen Dulles' work for NSC Survey Committee, during
and after 1948 campaign (report, Jan 1949) --
Transition overtones? Check also Gen. Carter,
DDCI, who in 1948 was Sec. Marshall's special asst.

1952: Briefings and liaison with nominees Eisenhower and
Stevenson

25X1A2g Vice Presidential candidates (Nixon and Sparkman)
Project "██████" in CIA and NSC
Post-Election Support to Pres. Elect Eisenhower and
his entourage

1956: CIA, Stevenson, and Eisenhower's Re-election Campaign
Vice President Nixon (R)
VP Candidate Kefauver (D), and pre-Convention candi-
dates Kennedy and Harriman

2. Transition planning by the outgoing NSC and Executive Branch, 1960:

Civil Service Commission (Jones), ca. Jan 1960

Budget Bureau (Staats, Macy, et al)

Pres. Adv Cmtee on Govt Organization, evidently moribund
by 1960? (Arthur S. Flemming, Milton S. Eisenhower, Don
Price, and Arthur Kimball)

Brookings Institution's external research on "Transition"--
Ford Foundation *(for and with knowledge and support of U.S. Govt?)*

NSC Surveys in national-security areas for Pres. Eisenhower
(and successor)

Preparation by NSC staff? -- Gray, Lay, etc.

Sprague committee, ca. Feb 1960

Kirkpatrick-Erskine-Macy-Elting "Joint study group,"
July 1960 (transition overtones?)

Hull board (Pres. Board)-- with transition overtones?
esp on old issue of divorce of CS activities?

Other advisory take-over studies before the November
1960 election? Re-check USIB policy studies (1960)
on emergency planning, cost-estimates and program-
ming, etc.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-6-

3. Intelligence as an "Issue" in the Campaign Debates, Jan-Oct 1960 (pre-Convention, Convention, and post-Convention campaign periods)
 - a. CIA overtures to head off pre-Convention would-be Democratic candidates: (1) danger of CIA as "football" in partisan "politics"; ^{but} (2) "Legislative Branch" liaison policy was also involved where candidates were also Congressmen.
 - Senator Johnson
 - Sen. Kennedy
 - Gov. Stevenson
 - Sen. Symington
 - Others?
 - b. CIA overtures to would-be Republican candidates (other than Nixon (already "in," on the NSC)).
4. Briefings to the four ^(two?) Presidential and Vice Presidential Candidates, immediately after Convention nominations: initiatives by CIA for overtures ^{30/3/60 Kennedy} made by President Eisenhower, July 1960
 - a. Briefings and liaison with Sen. Kennedy at Hyannisport, July-Aug 1960 ff.; Salinger as liaison; others (Harriman?)
 - b. CIA overtures to Sen. Johnson, VP candidate (and Space Chairman in Senate) summer-fall 1960
 - c. CIA liaison and ^(6/) briefings to VP candidate Lodge (UN Ambassador) 1960
 - d. CIA-VP (Dulles-Nixon) relationship during campaign, Oct 1960:
5. CIA and Presidential-Candidate Kennedy's Own Transition ^{PLANNING} Takeover Planning, July 1960 ff.

JFK's campaign and post-campaign organization for foreign-policy and national-security advice, transition planning, and takeover procedures, forming part of his elaborate set-up, eventually totalling 29 task forces, in summer 1960 to Nov 1960.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-7-

Foreign policy and policy reorganization study groups (with overtones for Intelligence):

Stevenson and Harriman, ca July 1960
Later Sharon and Ball

Defense reorganization, weapons development, etc. (also with overtones for Intelligence):

Symington et al, ca Oct 1960

National-security post-election policy-survey and take-over committee: Paul Nitze, David Bruce, Gilpatric, Perkins; also advisors with Intelligence connections, e.g., Gen. Hull, Gen. W.B. Smith, Robert Bowie, et al

"Scoop" Jackson's NSC machinery committee in Senate -- Democratic members served in effect as still another JFK advisory committee; testimony & hearings, ca. Feb 1960. *Key witnesses were many, from AWD (opinion) to Hilsenrath (JFK's*

Pressures for partisan reorganization study of "Intelligence" were increasingly relaxed as above studies and outgoing Adm's studies proceeded; while simultaneously, pressures and speculations increased, fall 1960, away from Intelligence to the policy and op levels at State and Defense, including e.g., speculations on the "new" Secy of State (Stevenson? Fulbright? etc, etc) and "new" Secy of Defense (Symington, et al), and other "bigger" political-military issues than tampering with USIB/CIA *Intell. man, to be, at State?*

Election campaign ended, Nov 1960, with immediate announcement (10 Nov 1964) by new President :

Clark Clifford, as JFK's "takeover" liaison with Eisenhower Adm.; and

Allen W. Dulles redesignated, without change, to manage the US Intelligence apparatus: spectacular victory for non-partisan bi-partisan transition, after all the "task force" planning on both sides.

J. Edgar Hoover, in this triumvirate, was also redesignated FBI head.

What other understandings (?), besides reappointment of Allen W. Dulles (above) had been agreed to by old and new Administration on the management of US Intelligence? Staffing of deputy slots? Staffing of DCI slot after ultimate retirement of AWD? *Staying of other USIB* Civilian-military control issue? Coldwar policy shift? etc. Any quid-pro-quo for AWD reappointment?

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-8-

CIA During the

III. Interregnum, November 1960-January 1961:

Hardly two neat and separate packages of "lame ducks" and "new frontiers" *for CIA:*
Change and Continuity of men (leadership), institutional arrangements, and a common policy concern for the Nation's security.

1. President Elect Kennedy's spectacular endorsement of existing CIA/USIB management, 10 Nov 1960, symbolized in re-appointment of Dulles *(see #, above)...*

Explanation of timing? Origins and credit? Alternative options facing old and new Administration? Reception at various levels of accountability--among NSC members? Legislative-Branch level? etc.

2. Election Night Obligation on CIA, "traditional" by 1960: to "protect" the new President, whoever he was, not so much the protection of the President's "person" (this was also "traditional"--the obligation of a sister service--the Secret Service of the Treasury Department), but the full "protection" of the President and his entourage with the benefit of the Nation's total intelligence-alert system, addressed in relation to the national security in particular, especially initially during the interlude between Election and Inauguration.

3. Launching of new series of briefings and liaison system for President-Elect, both intelligence and operations; in an atmosphere generally not hostile, critical, or awkward, but largely cordial, harmonious.

Palm Beach briefings (by Dulles and Bissell), 18 Nov.
Arrangements for continuing current-intelligence, estimative, and related intell support : *recheck DD/E mechanism...*
Liaison arrangements for President-Elect's statutory alter ego: Vice President Johnson

4. Initial liaison and liaison arrangements with President-Elect's temporary headquarters:

Direct liaison by DCI himself, already on the new "team": direct and immediate, cordial if not politically intimate

Off-campus liaison: Hyannisport, Palm Beach, etc.; cf. Augusta in 1960

(Nixon, after all, did almost win, by a statistical hair breadth?)
OC, ONI, etc.; also DD/P system.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-9-

Clark Clifford, announced at once as Kennedy's "Mr. Take-over": relationship with CIA during interregnum? ^{future} relationships in PFIAB not heralded ^{OR WAS THIS PART OF THE "QUID PRO QUIDO?"}

Overtures to CIA by (and to) other Kennedy advisers, e.g.:
Harriman - ex-NSC leader, ca. 1950-52
Gov. Williams and Representative Bowles
General Taylor
Kennedy's "29" task forces vis-a-vis CIA

Special significance of Budget Bureau liaison, via Staats (and Macy?)

5. Early briefings and liaison with Kennedy's cabinet and staff designees at the NSC level:

Rusk, Secretary of State, ^{dark-horse} designee (briefing of 20 Dec 1960)
McNamara, Secretary of Defense (10 Jan 1961), ^{likewise a dark horse}
Bundy, to succeed Gray as White House "national security" man (12 Jan); ^{other options?}

Other NSC-related designees were not briefed, before 20 Jan, either because they were not yet appointed or for other reasons:

Vice President: Johnson
Budget Bureau: Bell not to be appointed until after 20 Jan
Attorney General: Robert Kennedy, appointed (but held aloof?)
Treasury: Dillon, another "bi-partisan" transition executive
OCDM: Ellis not to be appointed until after 20 Jan

Other agencies with foreign responsibilities: Overtures in behalf of USIA (Murrow), ICA (Labouisse), embryonic Disarmament Agency (McCloy), etc. ^{Cabinet secretaries, held off until after 20 Jan.}

CIA's "institutional reserve" to the rest of the new political appointees ^{both among White House assistants and Cabinet secretaries and undersecretaries and comparable "political executives"}

6. CIA and Eisenhower's outgoing NSC, Nov. 1960-Jan. 1961:

NSC weekly meetings, uninterrupted: DCI with DD/I staffing
NSC secretariat, continuity: Lay, Boggs, etc.
OCB "formal" and "luncheon" meetings: DCI, with DD/P staffing
Departmental membership of special transition significance:
White House: Gray
State: Merchant
Defense: Douglas
AEC: McCone (not publicly listed as "OCB")
USIA and ICA:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-10-

Secretariat continuity: Bromley Smith, et al.
Sprague Committee recommendation (to keep OCB), formally turned down later by JFK

"Committee of Principals" (Nuclear Testing): DCI, with
OSI staffing:
State, DOD, AEC (McCone), CIA, BOB

"Special (Group) Meetings," on Cuba etc., meetings accelerated,
Nov 1960 ff., over the preceding six months

DCI attendance at Eisenhower "cabinet" meetings--: *for CIA, an*
institutional overlap with NSC meetings; CIA relationship to so-called "domestic" policy concerns; important for transition?

Other CIA-White House-NSC established relationships, continued up to last moment of the not-so-lame "lame duck" period. *E.g.:-*

Major community matters cleared by outgoing President and apparently endorsed by him, specifically, to the President-Elect:

JSG report of 15 Dec 1960, approved by Pres., 12 Jan 61
Sprague committee report, ca. 22-23 Dec 1960, likewise
President's Board recommendations, on CS, transmitted
by DCI ca. 9 Jan 1961; with Kirkpatrick's caution
not to deceive higher authority re institutional
arrangements re CS "reorganizations"

Tremendous amount of "homework" available to new President

NSCID No. 1 (and others), dating back to 1958, was reaffirmed by NSC, formally on 12 Jan 1961, personally approved by President Eisenhower on 18 Jan, and left with new President (who, in turn was to leave it unchanged as the basic mandate): symbolic of the continuity of Intelligence and the national-security alert system, regardless of Constitutionally-required political change.

7. DCI/CIA during Inauguration Weekend, 20 Jan 1961 ff.:

Ceremonial recognitions, luncheons, etc. (participated in by DCI et al, sometimes publicly and sometimes privately, which also was symbolic of Intelligence, addressed to outgoing and incoming Administrations:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-11-

Eisenhower entourage: DCI and Eisenhower, Nixon, Gray, Gates, Herter, and McCone; and CIA "disengagement" from the outgoing political executives

Kennedy entourage: "re-engagement," in effect, for CIA, not a discovery of a "new" frontier: i.e., establishing new relationships with old friends (and old critics, too), among the new appointees, many of whom belonged to Washington's various "elites" whom CIA had known, in some cases known for a long time.

Formalities of takeover in 1961, compared (for CIA) with 1952-53 (Truman-to-Eisenhower) and 1948-49 (Truman-to-Truman, but with Truman-to-Dewey expected by "everyone except Truman")

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~